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Commentary & Reply
From Parameters, Summer 2000, pp. 120-30.

RUSSIA'S PREDICTABILITY
To The Editor:
Dr. Richard Weitz's article "Managing an Unpredictable Moscow" (Parameters, Winter 1999-2000) contains three
fundamental errors. It errs in its assumptions, it errs in its methodology, and it errs in the validity of its policy
recommendations.
The first incorrect assumption is that the Yeltsin era is ending. The Yeltsin era or legacy is a Russia ruled by a superpresidential system lacking checks and balances to restrain executive power. This allowed Yeltsin to rule by decree,
initiate two brutal wars in Chechnya, and consolidate the profits of so-called economic reforms into the hands of a
hypercorrupt group of oligarchs and "liberal" reformers. Instead of creating the foundation of a liberal democratic
society, it negated progress toward limited government, rule of law, protection of individual rights, and transparency in
business dealings. The Yeltsin era will continue into the indefinite future because it will benefit whichever clique holds
the presidency.
The second incorrect assumption is that Vladimir Putin is only a transitional figure. Here I am not talking specifically
about Putin himself as the new President, but about Putin as a representation of the type of persons who are now
ascendant in the Russian government. The past three prime ministers of Russia have all been drawn from its security
services--the successors of the KGB. Recent events indicate that the Russian military has reached a level of influence
in policymaking circles possibly unprecedented in Russian or Soviet history. The ascent of this Chekist/military
influence in the Russian government, by persons whose formative years were spent in the most loyal and highly
propagandized bodies of the Soviet Union, is not transitional because those persons have integrated themselves into the
ruling structures of the Russian Federation.
The 1999 parliamentary election demonstrated that Putin was very popular even among many "reformers." While some
view this coalition as a victory for "centrist" forces, in reality the so-called reformers have surrendered liberal
democratic principles for a small share of power in the super-presidential system. Their need for Putin to continue with
past "reforms" is essentially a need to make sure they can keep what has been stolen to date. Putin and his like are far
from transitory figures because there is no politician or coalition in Russia today with the power to unseat him in an
election, deter him in the Duma, or even challenge him in the court of public opinion via access to a free and
independent media.
I also disagree with Dr. Weitz's use of a typical bureaucratic methodology, presenting left, right, and center options for
the future and supporting the most neutral one, for three reasons. First, he has minimized the negatives of the centrists.
Dr. Weitz stated that future centrist governments will be similar to Yeltsin's, with "a commitment to Western-style
liberal democracy, limited economic reforms, and the devolution of substantial authority to regional officials." He
contrasts this with a possible communist government which he believes would "restrict press freedoms and other
liberties traditionally associated with Western liberal democracies." But under Yeltsin, Western-style liberal
democracy did not flourish, and elections have been manipulated to provide a democratic veneer for an increasingly
authoritarian state. Not only is the KGB being resurrected, but many of the freedoms that Weitz believes the
communists would restrict have already been restricted by the "centrists."
The second error was to mitigate the foreign policy actions of the centrists and not see that they are almost identical to
the possible foreign policy actions he fears from a future nationalist government. By exploiting ethnic tensions in the

Caucasus and Moldova, using state energy and pipeline firms to put political pressure on the Baltics and Central Asia,
and trying to weaken US security abroad by proliferating weapons of mass destruction, Russia has already acted with
the aggressive nationalism Weitz warns about. Even though Dr. Weitz acknowledges Russia's past intrigues in Georgia,
Moldova, and Tajikistan, he believes that a nationalist government would be even more aggressive. But past actions
indicate that the centrist government would have been more aggressive too, had it only had the means. A lack of
resources, not a sense of good intentions toward the Near Abroad or the West, has been its main restraint. The centrists
are already nationalists.
The third mistake is the failure to note the growing convergence in Russian politics regarding foreign policy. Centrists,
communists, and nationalists alike believe that Russia should be a Great Power. The near universal support for the war
in Chechnya is just the tip of this sentiment. The other consensus is in the development of a Eurasian national identity
which is determined and enunciated by its opposition to the West. Weitz sees these factors as a problem only if Russia
is ruled by nationalists. He does not see these twin factors as part of a general foreign policy consensus. These two
trends have broad support among an electorate extremely disenchanted with Western values after suffering a most
egregious economic downturn under the twin rubrics of "democracy" and "capitalism." What this means is that Russia,
whoever leads it, will likely pursue a foreign policy of neo-imperialism in the Near Abroad and opposition to Western
influence in areas of Russian interest like the Balkans, the Middle East, and China.
In conclusion, most of the negatives that Dr. Weitz fears from future communist or nationalist governments are
already present in the current centrist regime. Therefore, his shaping strategies are already overtaken by events. We
cannot shape the direction that the Russians themselves have chosen to move in. We cannot bend Russia to the way we
wish it to be. The past decade of American attempts to do this should already be a warning to us that this is not
possible. What we should do is concentrate on recognizing what type of Russia exists today. A clear view of the
situation will prevent us from sending good money after bad and confusing long-term neo- imperial behavior for a
transitory phase which we hope will end when a different government takes office. Such a recognition is the true key
to managing our relations with Moscow and avoiding policies that do more harm than good.
Lieutenant Colonel Philip Wasielewski, USMCR
Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University
The Author Replies:
I wish to thank Lieutenant Colonel Wasielewski for his thoughtful commentary on my article. Since the art of political
forecasting is fraught with uncertainty and subjectivity, we all benefit from hearing as many insightful voices as
possible.
I believe that many of our differences reflect diverging time perspectives. Colonel Wasielewski's critique focuses on
the likely policies of "whichever clique holds the presidency." He rightly insists that we must recognize "what type of
Russia exists today." Most of his expectations for Russia over the next few years seem reasonable. In my own article, I
was trying to speculate on how Russia might evolve over the next two decades rather than just after the next election.
The longer out one looks, the greater the possibility that Russia might modify its present political and economic
system, and that the baneful influence of what Colonel Wasielewski refers to as "this Chekist/military influence in the
Russian government" will wane.
I agree with Colonel Wasielewski that "we cannot bend Russia to the way we wish it to be." But we might be able to
nudge it along in the right direction. Many factors will shape Russia's evolution during the next few decades, and US
policies can have some influence on Russia's foreign and (admittedly less so) domestic behavior.
Incidentally, I would like to call the interested reader's attention to two reports that appeared on Russian-American
relations after I wrote my article. They were issued this January concurrently by the Washington-based Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace and the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP) in Moscow. The two
influential institutions established study groups to examine how to improve US-Russian relations over the next few
years. They are available on the Carnegie web page (www.ceip.org).
Dr. Richard Weitz

FORCE PROJECTION AND FORCE PROTECTION
To the Editor:
In "Operation Allied Force: Yet Another Wake-Up Call for the Army?" (Parameters, Winter 1999-2000), author
Jeffrey Record appears to be arguing for a fight in the future that will not be a joint fight. The example he uses in
Kosovo is a classic example of trying to go it alone with air power. The results are clear in two areas: (1) The Serbs
achieved their strategic objective of driving the Albanian population from Kosovo and destroying the infrastructure.
(2) A ground occupation continues to siphon off funds needed for the operational readiness of the Army (e.g., two of
ten active divisions are not combat ready; we suffer from an increase in Operations Tempo [OPTEMPO] of more than
300 percent; and we see unprecedented deployment of Reserve and National Guard forces to meet world
requirements).
What is clear from the lessons of the recent past is that the armies of the world are procuring heavy forces. Our failure
to maintain the lethal punch contained in our heavy force, forsaking it for mobility, will be paid for in higher casualties
by our soldiers in the field. The fact is that even with superior technology, the actual fighting is done close in on the
ground (see Into the Storm: A Study of Command, by Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr.). The more lethal and
survivable we can make the force, the better. The Army is not the Marines, and we should be thinking in terms of
sustaining the fight once engaged.
Strategic lift is the real issue in force projection. Although less glamorous than futuristic weapons, it is much more
essential to the total effectiveness of a force projected from the United States. I hope the new technologies coming on
line will be added to, not substituted for, what works on the battlefield.
Lieutenant Colonel Nick Gibbs, AR, USAR
Louisville, Kentucky
The Author Replies:
I am well aware of the limits of air power, which were displayed in NATO's war against Serbia to the great misfortune
of the Albanian Kosovars. I am also aware that the Army wanted to have nothing to do with that war, in part because
too many in the Army's leadership have come to equate force protection with mission accomplishment. Happily, the
Army's new Chief of Staff understands the Army's growing disutility in the post-Cold War era absent fundamental
structural and doctrinal reform.
Jeffrey Record

THE LEGAL BASIS FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS
To the Editor:
Kudos to Parameters for the provocative article by Robert Tomes ("Operation Allied Force and the Legal Basis for
Humanitarian Interventions," Spring 2000). This is a surprisingly neglected issue. NATO and NATO nation officials
still have not provided a consistent and coherent explanation of the jus ad bellum, and neither the 1999 Alliance
Strategic Concept nor the 2000 Pentagon After Action Report to Congress fills that gap. The highly publicized and
contentious Allied Force operation may not prove, as some believe, an exception to the core function of collective
defense, and the geographic reach of future operations may even extend to the territory of the former Soviet Union,
with Russia having of course condemned the air campaign over Kosovo as inconsistent with the UN Charter. A
sustainable international legal argument needs to be clarified and strengthened. It is not a question of an external droit
de regard over NATO action, but of establishing a point of reference accepted by other governments, the public, and
Congress. And it is not axiomatically a stark choice between a more effective UN Security Council and "military
imperium," as argued in the same issue (Ambassador James E. Goodby and Kenneth Weisbrode, "Back to Basics: US

Foreign Policy for the Coming Decade").
To date the justifications given have been either weak or contradictory. For example, then Chairman of the NATO
Military Committee General Klaus Naumann testified before the US Senate Armed Services Committee on 3
November 1999 that there was no "clearly defined common interest" or "clear and present danger," and that NATO had
acted simply to uphold human rights. The After Action Report, however, cites two further principles: maintaining
regional stability against the threat of a spill- over of the conflict, and upholding NATO's credibility while maintaining
a cooperative relationship with Russia. Likewise, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson stated on 15 November
that "our strategic interest in preventing the conflict from spreading coincided with our humanitarian interest in
stopping ethnic cleansing." Legally, Allied Force has been characterized as a humanitarian "exception" to the need for
a UN Security Council mandate, as an exercise of an autonomous right to defend "values" and of a "moral duty," but
at the same time as in "support" of Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1999, which described the situation in Kosovo as
"a threat to peace and stability in the region" and in the "spirit" of the UN Charter. What is the "threat"--spillover into
other regions of the Balkans, when crimes against humanity are linked to raw geopolitics, or is ethnic cleansing ipso
facto an actionable affront to humanity? All or some of the above? And if maintaining NATO consensus and
demonstrating the credibility of its threats were so important, why did the White House publicly signal in late 1999
that it would secure victory with or without the alliance?
In reality, it seems closer to the truth that, as then NATO Secretary General Javier Solana stated on 22 June 1999, "To
some extent, we just have to go ahead where there are threats, and we'll work out the theory later." Also in reality,
Allied Force may well be simply a case of sound policy, of doing the right thing, regardless of bad law.
However, unless the concept of humanitarian intervention can attract wider regional, if not international, support as jus
cogens then the problem of a precedent being abused does indeed arise, as the author cites regarding Hitler's
Liebensraum policy--and the same could be said of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" or Tiananmen Square to defend
"socialism" from subversion. Without a right of intervention recognized at least among like-minded nations, we risk
reverting to the 19th century, in which war in the name of "interests" other than defense of territory or of political
independence could be launched according to the warring state's own definition of its interests, a theory which for
obvious reasons has been "generally discredited" (Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International
Law, Seventh Revised Edition, Routledge, 1998, p. 312). And in the absence of an accepted principle, even if not
endorsed internationally, NATO will confront politically sensitive issues about attempts to minimize civilian casualties
and property destruction and keep NATO-Russia relations on track. The potential for divisiveness is demonstrated by
the fact that NATO was never able to agree on the relatively simple if subjective notion of "areas of interest" even
during the Cold War. And surely if judicial opinion is divided on the question on whether a state can intervene to
defend its own nationals, then intervention on behalf of non-nationals is at best no less suspect.
It is true that the NATO Strategic Concept offers a permissive framework for "crisis management" of the EuroAtlantic area and is "in conformity" with the UN Charter, with a principal, agreed purpose of the Charter being to
promote human rights. But more should be attempted for the sake of legitimacy and public support. A first step would
be to revisit the otherwise sterile 1999 "Charter for European Security" adopted by the 54-state Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Charter notes that internal developments can pose a "threat" to "our
security," and noninterference in internal affairs is not a defense if OSCE human rights and other commitments are
violated, although regrettably Russia did resort to that illegitimate defense regarding outside criticism of the civil war
in Chechnya after having earlier in the 1990s championed defense of human rights. But there is no OSCE enforcement
mechanism, and the general decisionmaking rule is one of consensus. The United States and like-minded nations
should work to adapt this, which would prove a linchpin test of whether Russia does indeed seek to join the Western
mainstream and would not risk, as Washington has traditionally instinctively feared, undermining NATO. Another
direction could be to make more use of the precedent of the 1950 UN General Assembly "Uniting for Peace" resolution
that urged enforcement action regarding Korea because of an obstacle in the Security Council.
A passive or dismissive attitude or ad hoc approach to justifying humanitarian intervention risks paralysis and moral
abdication. The Alliance must approach codifying the right or even duty of humanitarian intervention with the same
energy and persistence it exhibited with Allied Force. At the dawn of a new century, it is surely worth reflecting on
Henry Kissinger's dictum, as recorded in his classic A World Restored (Houghton Mifflin, 1957, p. 1): "Whenever

peace--conceived as the avoidance of war--has been the primary objective . . . the international system has been at the
mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community." And, of course, if the allies do not correct the
deficiencies witnessed during and after Allied Force with progress accurately reported to Congress, and if the Pentagon
does not adapt its primary focus on winning two major theater wars, then diplomacy cannot be effectively matched
with force through law.
John Borawski
Director of the Political Committee
NATO Parliamentary Assembly 1987-1999
To the Editor:
Robert Tomes has attempted to put lipstick on a hog by claiming an obscure jus cogens argument may exist to lend
NATO's attack on Yugoslavia last year legitimacy under international law. In fact, most of the article seems to
establish that NATO's military campaign was illegitimate under existing international norms, laws, and treaties. Mr.
Tomes notes, correctly, that "from a formal legal standpoint, NATO's action were illegitimate." Intervention by
sovereign states to overthrow the immoral actions of other sovereign states has a long history, and can be justified on
the basis that they are a shock to the conscience of humanity. The long-term efforts by the Royal Navy in the 19th
century to interdict the trans-Atlantic slave trade is one example. But let us not fool ourselves, these types of
interventions are based on only one law--the law of superior force. Mr. Tomes notes that "if human rights violations
are a legitimate reason for claiming a threat to peace in one region, then they must be in others. Of course, this begs
the question as to why NATO or the United States fails to act in all similar cases, a question that is answered by
looking at other motives for intervention not addressed in this article." It is convenient to ignore similar cases for
interventions in places like Chechnya, Tibet, and numerous locales in Africa because the cost for such intervention is
far too high. This may be reality, but it is not international law.
The far graver threat we face as Americans is not that international law is too weak to form a basis for intervention to
prevent human rights outrages, but that our own rule of law in arriving at those affirmative decisions has been
undermined by the NATO action. Our rule of law is grounded in our Constitution, which stipulates that only Congress
can declare war. President Clinton and many of his predecessors have routinely, openly, and in some cases,
outrageously, violated this constitutional imperative. At the time NATO attacked Yugoslavia, the Congress would not
and did not declare war as required by the Constitution. In addition, the agreement by which the United States
participated in the war, the NATO Charter, itself does not contain any provision for launching an attack against
another state absent an attack on a NATO member. In other words, NATO's attack was illegal under its own treaty,
and the US participation was illegal under the Constitution. I have asked the State Department to furnish me with its
legal reasoning for the basis of the NATO actions. I am still waiting.
I support the idea that military force can be used to intervene and stop human rights outrages. However, this should be
done within the framework of our rule of law. Our Constitution exists because it is the social contract by which we
have agreed to share the risks that form a threat to our liberty. We are a member of NATO because it is a social
contract with other nations to share the risks that form a threat to our collective liberty. Intervene by all means, but do
it legally by making the case to the American people. Americans have a long history of acting in just causes, they will
do the right thing, but they must agree that it is the right thing to do. That process requires political leadership and
should not be ignored for the sake of convenience.
Mike McGlothlin
Long Beach, California
The Author Replies:
John Borawski's commentary raises important issues, makes a strong and cogent argument, and adds important insight
into the policy aspects of NATO's intervention in Kosovo. Among his other points, he asks why is the legal aspect of
intervention such a neglected issue and why has there been so little official communication of the jus ad bellum
aspects of Allied Force. I purpose four general answers.

Like intervention decisions, reasons for remaining silent on legal ramifications have little to do with international law
arguments. Mike McGlothlin reinforces this point from my article in his commentary. The following paragraphs also
address his comments, although he seems to have misunderstood my objective (for which the blame is mine).
The first answer to Mr. Borawski's comments is straightforward: the outcome of the intervention is not yet clear.
Several factors are noteworthy here, many of which may address why the State Department has not answered Mr.
McGlothlin's requests for documentation. Official--public--reviews of the legality of Allied Force under international
law are inappropriate while NATO forces are still engaged in consolidating the peace. This relegates the debate to
pundits, scholars, and zealots, whose views are often predetermined. As Edward Luttwak and others have argued, it
may be that the intervention really staved off an ethnopolitical conflict that will draw regional actors into a larger and
more bloody conflict. Members of the Kosovo Liberation Army dissatisfied with peace-making have stepped up
attacks on Serb forces, leaders of which seek to draw American forces into conflict to spoil American will for
continued US involvement. Only if NATO succeeds in the long run will allies and others be more willing to advocate a
new legal norm for humanitarian intervention. But issue attention spans are short, and periods lacking highly
publicized genocide do not promote the focus required to reform black letter law. (So, the best hope for reform lies in
building a customary law argument, requiring additional interventions outside the UN system.) As McGlothlin points
out, jus cogens is an obscure international law tool--but in the context of my article few tools exist.
A second reason is the ongoing war crimes trials. The discovery process-- really the reading into the record of crimes,
activities of the charged, and the plight of victims--is as much for world opinion as it is for judicial opinion. The war
crimes trials, compared to the acts of violence that sparked them, are not in the headlines or the focus of the evening
news. Subsequently, a much smaller, technical audience is tuning in. Only when the war crimes of Kosovo, or of other
events drawing humanitarian intervention, are widely reported and followed (as was the Nuremberg Trials) will public
support for an international legal norm backed by action spring forth. Also, the decision coming out of the war crimes
trials cannot be prejudiced by a public discussion of the legality of intervention, which would revolve around
justifications for intervention and thus the crimes being tried. As for deeper American values and preserving the
morality underscoring our Constitution, our best hope for the spread of the ethos of democratic responsibility is the
profusion of normative institutions.
A third reason is that national security decisionmaking is rarely upheld for legal analysis, which is another way of
saying public scrutiny of national morality. The only recent and truly successful international movement concerning
the morality of national security decisionmaking was the Ottawa Convention to Ban Landmines. It succeeded
(although not completely) through a massive mobilization of world support. Mobilization worked partly because many
countries considered their use of landmines in the near future to be unlikely, because hair-splitting legal and policy
arrangements were made to prevent the total ban of any future landmine use, and because the country most likely to
use landmines refused to a total ban (the United States). Many view NATO's intervention as a further manifestation of
American and Western European attempts at world dominance (moral justification of a larger immoral objective).
Subsequently, the level of mobilization required to amend existing agreements and laws is unlikely in the realm of
intervention. Moreover, the morality of some countries' forces has been questioned due to abuses of power. In part this
is a failing of the UN, which has leadership and commitment problems stemming from consensus-based
decisionmaking.
Finally, while I agree with Mr. Borawski that a "sustainable international legal argument needs to be clarified and
strengthened," as the lack of any movement in this direction indicates, such arguments are likely to surface only when
interventions are being debated. For these arguments to become "a point of reference accepted by other governments,
the public, and Congress," they must exist in an atmosphere conducive to focusing on legal arguments rather than on
the passions and politics surrounding deployment decisions. As Borawski points out by quoting Javier Solana,
decisionmakers focus on the costs and benefits of intervention rather than on legal theorizing: they focus on pragmatic
politics and "work out the theory later." The same is true concerning Mr. McGlothlin's plea for a strict interpretation of
the founders' Constitution. Additionally, in an era where much tension exists between globalizing forces (including the
spread of legal norms) and sovereignty, many states are reluctant to start down a path that weakens the formal
international legal regime my article discussed.
Despite all of this, one thing is evident: the best and most appropriate place for a discussion of intervention to flourish

is in the pages of military and defense publications like Parameters. The military and civilian decisionmakers who give
substance to the process of informing statesmen on interventions must be the most informed on this issue--theirs are
the voices that speak with the least political bias. They, more than many realize, are likely to agree with John Quincy
Adams's 1821 admonition that America not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. At the same time, they take
seriously Lincoln's 1860 sentiment to have faith that right makes might. Shaping regional security, as outlined in the
National Security Strategy, cannot be accomplished without acting to prevent threats to peace and security from
escalating.
I conclude by turning to the idea of a social contract, which Mr. McGlothlin refers to in his commentary. This is
exactly the concept we should apply to intervention (although Mr. McGlothlin treats the concept too narrowly). A
social contract is not merely a pact between rulers and the ruled: it is a pact to establish rules. This applies to
institutionalizing constitutional principles as much as it does to shaping a global civil society in which democratic
ideals take root and blossom.
Robert Tomes

THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN ALLIED FORCE
To the Editor:
Dr. Earl Tilford's article "Operation Allied Force and the Role of Air Power" (Parameters, Winter 1999-2000), is an
important contribution to the ongoing debate among scholars and policymakers on air power and the lessons of
Kosovo. He rightly challenges the official view of the Clinton Administration that Operation Allied Force was an
overwhelming success, and he makes a strong case that "air power alone could not succeed, and it did not succeed in
accomplishing the objectives specified by President Clinton on 24 March 1999." Dr. Tilford demonstrates convincingly
the illogic of US strategy and how the Serbs exploited the strategy's incoherence and ineptness, taking advantage of the
strategic, operational, and tactical mistakes of the allies. He shows why hitting enemy targets and causing destruction
will not necessarily lead to achieving one's political objectives.
However, in order to advance the debate on the relevance of air power in future operations, the question should have
been posed in a different way--instead of asking whether air power alone can do the job, the question should be under
what circumstances and for what purposes is air power an effective tool of military coercion. Almost always,
decisionmakers use more than one instrument of pressure (both military and non-military); they rely on diplomacy,
economic sanctions, military threats or use of force, and it is very difficult to determine the relative effect of each of
these on the opponent's decision to comply. (Take Japan in World War II for example: What made her surrender? Was
is strategic air attacks, was it the blockade, or was it the Soviet attacks in Manchuria?) As Richard Overy writes about
the bombing of Germany and Japan, "There has always been something fundamentally implausible about the
contention of bombing's critics that dropping almost 2.5 million tons of bombs on tautly-stretched industrial systems
and war-weary urban populations would not seriously weaken them. The air offensive was one of the decisive elements
in Allied victory." (Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won [New York: W. W. Norton, 1995], p. 133.) Again, this is not
to argue that air power by itself won the war, but to try to assess its contribution in the context of the other coercive
instruments used.
The debate on the role of air power for the outcome of Operation Allied Force can be advanced through carefully
discussing the role of the other instruments of pressure that influenced Mr. Milosevic's decision calculus. And such
discussion is missing from Dr. Tilford's article. In order to evaluate what air power did and did not accomplish, he
could have discussed the role of the alternative instruments of pressure brought to bear on the Serbs such as:

. The sustained diplomatic efforts of the international community and particularly the Chernomyrdin/Ahtisaari mission.
The military agreement signed at Kumanovo air base on 9 June 1999 shows that NATO did make some significant
concessions, such as: agreeing to put the peacekeeping force under UN and not NATO auspices; restricting the
deployment of KFOR peacekeepers to Kosovo without access to the whole of Yugoslavia (as demanded at
Rambouillet); and, probably the key compromise, discarding the provisions for a referendum to determine the future

status of the province and thus allowing Yugoslavia to retain legal sovereignty over Kosovo. By showing Milosevic
that he is politically isolated and can expect no help even from Russia, the EU/Russian mission seems to have had a
bigger influence on Milosevic and his decision to agree to NATO's terms than is currently admitted, but we need more
evidence on that.

. KLA actions on the ground and especially its resurgence in the latter weeks of the air campaign. Evidence shows that
the Serbs suffered the most substantial military casualties in the last two weeks of the air campaign, coinciding with
the KLA resurgence.

. The buildup of NATO ground combat power in the region, the increased discussion and planning for the use of
ground forces, and their influence on Milosevic. For example, what was the impact of events such as the approval of
the KFOR-Plus plan and the visible preparations for the deployment of additional forces, the 31 May decision of the
US government to allow General Wesley Clark to strengthen and widen the road from Durres to Kukes, the role of
Task Force Hawk in Albania, and the NATO peace implementation forces in Macedonia?

. Additional forms of non-military coercion, such as enforcing the economic sanctions against Yugoslavia, tightening
travel restrictions, freezing the financial holdings of the Milosevic regime, and the Serbian leader's indictment by the
International War Crimes Tribunal. Dr. Tilford could have strengthened his argument by presenting data in support of
any of the above points. Since reliable evidence (especially on the Serbian side) is hard to find, we may have to admit
that, at this point, we simply do not know enough in order to decide what exactly made Milosevic decide to give in.
To my mind, Dr. Tilford somewhat underestimates the accomplishments of air power in Kosovo. After all, the air
strikes did cause Milosevic to fear internal unrest (e.g., popular discontent, dissatisfaction within the military, growing
friction between the Montenegrin leaders and Belgrade) and ultimately give in. Fostering internal dissent by striking
strategic targets was a major contribution of the air campaign. A more important shortcoming of the article, however,
is the underestimation of the severity of the dilemma facing US decisionmakers in conflicts like this one where truly
vital US interests are not at stake but, at the same time, there are strong humanitarian and political pressures on the US
to intervene and "do something." Dr. Tilford may be right in his attempts to debunk the belief that precision air strikes
can deliver bloodless, low-cost victories and to show that, as it was in Kosovo, these are victories without triumph.
However, he underestimates the seductiveness of this "promise" of air power for policymakers and that "air-alone"
strategies are bound to be tried (even though logic and experience tells us that they hardly ever work) exactly because,
politically, this may be the only feasible strategy. Having in mind the strong domestic and international constraints on
the use of US force and the countervailing pressures to "do something" and right the wrongs, decisionmakers often
won't be able to do what is rational and proper in terms of sound military strategy.
Dessie Zagorcheva
Doctoral student, Department of Political Science
Columbia University, New York
The Author Replies:
I am grateful to Ms. Zagorcheva for her commentary on my article, "Operation Allied Force and the Role of Air
Power." The article was narrowly focused, as the title indicates. Indeed, my article reflects the mindset of too many
people throughout the military services who mistake the operational for the strategic, and in many cases do not seem to
know the difference.
Other than the controversy over the supposed decisiveness of strategic bombing in World War II, I concede every point
made by Ms. Zagorcheva. Even her references to Richard Overy's excellent work, Why the Allies Won, is good because
while facts are facts and there is a definitive truth for historians to pursue, we may be wise if we never let ourselves
become convinced that we have sole possession of that truth. That's a point air power evangelicals--along with Earl
Tilford--need to keep in mind.
I wrote the article in July 1999, in the almost immediate aftermath of the end of the bombing, just as air power

enthusiasts and true believers were bellowing, "For the first time in history air power has defeated a land army." They
were, of course, making a claim about air power already staked out at the end of the Persian Gulf War. If one really
wanted to make a case for the pivotal role of air power in halting an enemy ground offensive, one would hold up
Operation Linebacker I, the air power response to North Vietnam's Nguyen Hue Offensive in the spring of 1972. Air
power has possessed some unique and awesome capabilities for over a quarter of a century, and no institution can
employ those capabilities as well as the United States Air Force. As a military force, it is "simply the best."
As for Operation Just Cause, air power effected an outcome that was unique in that, working in combination with a
number of other political, diplomatic, and military elements of power, it achieved the goal of compelling Slobodan
Milosevic to withdraw the Serbian army and police from Kosovo. The wonder is that it did it so precisely, by hitting
those targets that resulted in Milosevic changing his behavior and acceding to NATO's demands. Belgrade was not
devastated and the Serbian people, for the most part, escaped undue harm. The use of air power in Operation Allied
Force was truly a remarkable display of bombing as an instrument of compellance. I did not make that point in my
article because I had not thought it through sufficiently to do so--a trap of writing in the immediate aftermath of any
significant event.
Ms. Zagorcheva is also right about the seductiveness implicit in the promise of air power. The notion that victory can
be purchased cheaply and quickly through bombing has been around for almost as long as the airplane, certainly since
the last days of World War I. But today that argument is even more appealing because of the tremendous capabilities
inherent in precision guided weapons. But as Ms. Zagorcheva points out, war is extremely complex, far more so than
air power advocates, who approach war as quintessentially a targeting problem, seem to know or understand. Because
air power enthusiasts speak with the authority of their convictions--they really do believe in air power--their offer is
most seductive. They offer the political leadership a seemly clear choice between the commitment of ground forces
with all the potential for bloodshed and sacrifice that entails on the one hand, or, on the other, quick victory at minimal
cost through precision strike. Even if the political leadership does understand military power and has some cognizant,
conscious comprehension of the art of war, the choice is too stark and the answer too apparent. A further danger is that
our capability to use violence so precisely makes it too easy to turn to the military option. Since ultimately war is a
human undertaking, one encompassing the full range of passions that issue from hatred and revenge, when we use
violence we run the risk of unleashing the dogs of war.
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